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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

S

Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.

:

Case No. 900393-CA

t

BARRY DUANE MORGAN,

I

Category No. 2

Defendant-Appellant. :

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of two counts of rape
of a child, both first degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-402.1 (1990).

This Court has jurisdiction to hear

the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp.
1990), as the appeal has been transferred to this Court from the
Utah Supreme Court.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Did defendant fail to preserve certain objections

to admission of evidence at trial; or, for the objections which
were preserved, did the trial court abuse its discretion by
admitting the evidence?

As a general rule, appellate courts will

not review claims of error if no contemporaneous and specific
objection to the error was raised in the trial court.
Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989).

State v.

If an objection was

raised below, a trial court ruling on the admissibility of

evidence will not be reversed absent a demonstration that the
trial court abused its discretion such that it created a
likelihood of injustice.

State v. Royball, 710 P.2d 168, 169

(Utah 1985).
2.

Did defendant's trial counsel provide ineffective

assistance?

This Court applies the two-prong test from State v.

Framef 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986), in reviewing claims of
ineffective assistance.

That test is (1) whether counsel's

representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness, and (2) whether there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's error, the result would have been
different.

State v. Pursifell, 746 P.2d 270, 275 (Utah Ct. App.

1987).
3.

Did the trial court commit plain error when it

admitted evidence of defendant's other bad acts?

To determine if

an error which was not objected to warrants a reversal, this
Court must determine (1) if the error should have been obvious to
the trial court, and (2) if the error was harmful.

State v.

Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah), cert, denied, 110 S.Ct. 62
(1989).
4.

Did defendant preserve the issue of prosecutorial

misconduct in closing argument?

Appellate courts will not review

a claim of error regarding a prosecutor's comments in closing
argument if no contemporaneous objection to the error was raised
in the trial court.

State v. Humphreyy 793 P.2d 918, 925 (Utah

Ct. App. 1990).
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The language of the provisions upon which the .'•>I di i>
relies is included i n the body of th I s 1: »rief .
STATEMENT OF I'HE CASE
Defendant was charged on March 3
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November 10
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.e matter

was transferred

this Court by the Utah Supreme Court .«

'
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Defendant is a tramp miner who nas travel led throughout

230-32).

He had sole custody of his twin daughters, Machele and

Rhonda Morgan (R. at 226). Defendant and the girls moved to
Duchesne in April of 1986, when the girls were thirteen years of
age (R. at 160 and 163).
One evening in October of 1986, Machele went to
defendant's bedroom to talk with him and found that he had been
drinking (R. at 172). He stated that he wanted to talk to her
about allegations that a friend of his had molested Machele
previously (R. at 173). Defendant began to fondle Machele and
then removed her underpants and performed sexual intercourse with
her (R. at 173-74).

Machele did not tell anyone about the abuse

because no one had believed her when she told about the earlier
molestation by defendant's friend (R. at 176).
Sometime later, defendant became angry at Machele and
Rhonda and beat them in the presence of one of their friends (R.
at 176-77).

A few days later, defendant called Machele into his

room to talk about the beating (R. at 177). He made her
"snuggle" up to him then began to fondle her.

Eventually he

performed sexual intercourse with her, ejaculating on her stomach
(R. at 177-79).
On a third occasion, defendant's girlfriend had left
after a fight (R. at 179). Defendant wanted to talk to Machele
about the fight; as before, defendant began fondling Machele and
had sexual intercourse with her (R. at 179-80).

She did not

report these occurrences because she was afraid of her father's
The trial transcript has been paginated internally, then
stamped with record page numbers. This brief will use the record
page numbers for transcript citations.
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living
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verbally with Vivian when Vivian accused Machele ol wanting to
tear the famiJII ] ; apa i: I: ai 1 ::t sill e<= % \ ; :i th I lex fc 1:1 le i: a q n i in | II"
a n d II 9 2 )

Ii Ihe i I Machele swore at Viviai I

iit I (id

i :i vian' s fifteen-year-

old son physically attacked Machele (R. at 166, 195, and 295)

foster care :ii n Arizona (R. a !::: J Il 4 3 5)

While i i I the foster 1 lome ,

Machele disclosed that her father had had sexual intercourse with
h
Rhonda testified that she and Machele did not 1 ike
living in Vivian's home

at 209). The final fight betw eei i

V

a i id Mac! leJII e

learned that Vivian was trying

suade Vivian's own fifteen

year-old daughter to become pregnant by defendant to give Vivian
a
Defendant denied thai the abuse had ever occuried (R.
at 239)

He testified that. Machele had sent him a lettei from

the foster home, denying the allegations, and telling h i in tha t

she had only accused him in order to get away from the home (R.
at 240-41).

When he received the letter, defendant became angry

and threw it away (R. at 241-43).

He admitted slapping the

girls, stating that that was appropriate discipline (R. at 228-29
and 245). He also admitted "goosing" the girls and pinching
their breasts; he thought that it was

lf

[j]ust something you do"

(R. at 244-45).
Vivian and her four children testified that Machele was
a troublemaker who made up stories of abuse to get attention and
to alienate defendant's friends (R. at 257-60, 284-85, 288-89,
292-93, and 295-96).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant's claims of error in points I, II, III, and V
are not supported by citations to the record or by analysis of
the applicability of the cases cited to the facts of this case.
Consequently, this Court should decline to review the claims of
error in those points.
Defendant has failed to preserve certain of his
admissibility of evidence claims for review by failing to object
below.

Of the claims which were preserved, the trial court did

not abuse its discretion by overruling the objections.

Evidence

of the fondling of the victim's sister by defendant and the
allegations that defendant's wife had provided drugs to a minor,
were elicited by defense counsel's questioning in the first
instance, and their admission did not rise to the level of
reversible error in any event.

Defendant was not denied the effective assi stance of
c

HIM I

'.testimony,

Il i Il in I

b ] e < , I. lb : • : em : t: ii : i i i,

c: ::: m :ii is a I
l acted within his theory of the case and i n

furtherance of hi s stated trial strategy.
1

Eili

evidence -x other bad acts by defendant

Given, defense counsel's

stated trial strategy, the error in admitting this other evidence

Defendant failed
prosecutor
i

object to comments made by the

closing argument and thus did i lot preserve the
revxew.
ARGUMENT
POINT

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
BY ADMITTING CERTAIN EVIDENCE,
As a preliminary matter, only defendant ~ fourth and
sixth points contain -

citations to the record i:. support oi
i) (9) , 1 J I i ill: > I Ii Il i MIS • •• Ill: a |

h

••

Procedure, provides:
The argument [of an appellate brief] shall
contain the contentions and reasons of the
appellant with respect to the issues
presented, with citations to the authorities,
statutes, and parts of the record relied on,.
This Court explained
Standard Oil Co, of Cal

- impact of th i s r ul e i n Koulis v.
2i
l ll 1 82 (I J I

If a party fails to make a concise
statement of the facts and citation of the
pages in the record where those facts are
supported, the court wil 1 assume the
correctness of the judgment below. • . •
"This Court need not, and will not, consider
any facts net properly cited
, or supported
bv thp .-eccx<

;

The Advisory Committee Note to Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure on Rule 24 also
requires each party submitting a brief to set
forth a properly documented argument: "The
argument shall contain the contentions of the
appellant with respect to the issues
presented and the reasons therefor, with
citations to the authorities, statutes, and
parts of the record relied on."
Rule 24(k) sets forth minimum standards of
adequacy for arguments, and sanctions for
failure to adhere to these standards.
Requirements and Sanctions. . . . Briefs
which are not in compliance may be
disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua
sponte by the court[.]
Id. at 1184 (quoting Uckerman v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 588
P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978)) (other citations omitted).

Because

defendant has failed to cite to the record to support his claims
in points I, II, III and V, this Court should disregard those
arguments.
Defendant's first three claims of error involve the
admission of evidence of acts by defendant other than two acts of
sexual intercourse charged in the information.

These three

claims will be addressed jointly in this point.
Addressing to the merits of defendant's claims in
points I, II, and III, two different standards of review are
applicable.

As the record demonstrates, and defendant admits,

some of the evidence he now challenges was not objected to at
trial.

As the Utah Supreme Court stated in State v. Johnson, 774

P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989):
"A general rule of appellate review in
criminal cases in Utah is that a
contemporaneous objection or some form of
specific preservation of claims of error must
be made a part of the trial court record
before an appellate court will review such
claim on appeal."
•8-

16.

)

...j orate v. Tillman t

P.2d 5 46, :•
shoulc

(Utah 1987)

Under the general rule, this Court

• ••"* *— -ddress allegations of error which were not

prese.i

I ow

u

.

Some of the evidentiary ma I ters c :>£ w! i ich defendant
complains in the first three points : f Ji i s b c • i ef v
a

I i lull

I!

:>

HI I I established that •• [t]he trial cour

ruling on the admissibility of evidence will not be reversed
absent a showing that the

5

to create f likelihood that injustice resulted
Royball,

-

(Utah : -

ee also State v. Gentry,

7

.

be applied

,,—

State v.

ff'vi ev shoij I ci

matters properly preserved below.
Waiver.

D

-

improperly admitted:

, Evidence that defendant "goosed" c

pinched the breasts o f , and fondled, the victim's twin sister;
(

,.u

Vivian had asked her fifteen-year- ;
by defendar*

*™r and i, fin at,
daughtei

"idence that defendant

become pregnant
-«--.-,--• and

\, evidence

. incident

: rape in Duchesne, and other fondling and intercourse with t e
victim which occurred in other states.
Nc objection was ever raised, to the evidence that
defendant "goosed" s~d pinched the girls (R, at 132;.

ii* iaci,

wwiendant has also alleged ineffective assistance of counsel
for failure to object and plain erroi In admission of the
evidence. These issues are treated In separate points.,

defendant admitted on direct examination that he did those acts;
he claimed that they were normal, were meant in jest, and had no
sexual connotation (R. at 244). Defendant also never objected to
testimony that he had beaten the victim (R. at 176-77).

On

direct examination, he claimed that he had slapped the girls, not
beaten them, and that his discipline was appropriate (R. at 22829 and 245). The testimony of a third incident of rape of the
victim, of defendant "grabbing" the victim's breasts while in
Colorado and California, and of similar sexual incidents
occurring in South Dakota and Montana also did not elicit
objections by defendant at trial (R. at 179, 173, and 181). None
of these alleged errors have been preserved for appellate review
because defendant failed to object to them below.

Because the

errors were not preserved, this Court should decline to address
them.

State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989).
B.

Matters to Which Objections Were Raised.

The remaining allegations of error in points I, II, and
III, which were preserved for review, are that the trial court
erroneously admitted evidence defendant fondled the victim's twin
sister and that Vivian provided drugs to and asked her daughter
to bear defendant's child.

Defendant did object during the

testimony of Ryan Bond in the following exchange:
Q. (By Mr. Gillespie) [prosecutor] Did
you — did the defendant, Mr. Morgan, make
any statements to you regarding the
allegations that had been made?
A. Yes, he did.
Q. What did the defendant say?
Mr. Rich [defense counsel]: May the
record clearify [sic] that this is an
allegation regarding rape of the children?
Is that the allegation that we are
addressing?
-10-

Q. (By Mr. Gillespie) What were the
allegations you were investigating at that
time?
A. The allegations that we were
investigating were that Mr. Morgan had
fondled Rhonda Morgan and had sexual
intercourse with Machele Morgan.
Mr. Rich; I'll object to that based on
the fact that at least one half of that is
irrelevant to this case, and his response to
the allegations related to fondling Rhonda
have nothing to do with the rape of Machele
that is alleged in the information before the
court here today.
Mr. Gillespie: Your Honor[,] I would
state that this shows a common purpose and
scheme of a father going to be having
intercourse with one daughterf the fact that
he is taking inappropriate sexual moves with
the other daughter is certainly relevant to
that.
The Court: Well, the objection is
overruled. Mr. Rich in fact asked for the
specific — asked the question about what the
allegations were, and the witness was simply
answering the question asked by Mr. Rich.
Mr. Rich: Well, let me say my purpose in
doing that was because I knew we were headed
here, we were about to broaden the attack on
my client in an unwarranted fashion. I
simply raised that in advance, hoping that we
wouldn't trod out the wide variety of
allegations against my client where he is
accused of only these two accounts [sic]. We
are now in the process of smearing the
courtroom with that, and I think that's in
violation of Rules of Evidence 401, 402, 403
and 404. It doesn't qualify under any other
exceptions.
The Court: Well, the objection is
overruled. The allegations have been stated.
It's not to be pursued on the basis of this
witness' knowledge any further, and the
record is now made.
(R. at 128-29).

No further testimony was elicited from Mr. Bond

about the allegation of defendant fondling Rhonda.

-11-

On appeal, defendant appears to be challenging the
3
4
5
admission of this testimony under rules 403, 404(b), and 801,
Utah Rules of Evidence.

While defendant cites cases regarding

the admission of testimony of prior crimes or bad acts, he does
not provide analysis of the applicability of the rules of
evidence or the case law to the present case.

In his brief,

defendant states:
The admissibility of prior bad acts
evidence is subject to the protection of the
Utah Rule of Evidence, Rule 403. . . . In
this case the evidence admitted was extremely
and unfairly prejudicial to the defendant and
was not probative of any material fact at
issue in the case against the defendant.

The text of rule 403 reads:
Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.
4
The text of rule 404(b) reads:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts
is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident.
5
This rule contains definitions of the terms used in the
hearsay rule. The definition of "hearsay" itself appears to be
the portion of that rule pertinent to this appeals; it reads:
"Hearsay" is a statement, other than one
made by the declarant while testifying at the
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted.
Although it is not clear what defendant intended when he cited
rule 801, he is probably referring to rule 802, the text of which
reads:
Hearsay is not admissible except as
provided by law or by these rules.
-12-

(Brief of Appellant [hereafter Br. of App.] at 10). These
blanket statements do not serve to provide a legal or factual
analysis of the evidence admitted in this case.

Defendant does

not even mention rule 404(b) in the context of the admissibility
of Mr, Bond's testimony.

Because defendant fails to provide

analysis of the applicability of the law to the facts in this
case, this Court should decline to address this issue on appeal.
State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989) ("Rule 24(a)(9)
of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court requires that the argument
section of a brief 'contain the contentions of the [party] with
respect to the issues presented and the reasons therefor/ with
citations'") (emphasis in original).
Defendant's only reference to rule 801 is
The evidence came in through Ryan Bond who
testified as to what the girls had told him.
The evidence was hearsay under Rule 801, Utah
Rules of Evidence and was inadmissible on
that ground.
(Br. of App. at 12). No objection on that basis was interposed
at trial; consequently, this Court should decline to address the
admissibility issue on that ground.

State v. Carter, 707 P.2d

656, 660 (Utah 1985) ("where a defendant fails to assert a
particular ground for suppressing unlawfully obtained evidence in
the trial court, an appellate court will not consider that ground
on appeal").
The trial court did not overrule defendant's objection
on the basis that the evidence of defendant fondling Rhonda did
not violate the rules of evidence; it overruled the objection on
the basis that the evidence was elicited by a request for

-13-

clarification made by defendant's counsel.

Mr. Bond was

testifying regarding statements made to him by defendant about
the "allegations that had been made" (R. at 128). Defense
counsel interrupted at that point and asked for clarification
about what allegations were being addressed.

Mr. Bond responded

that the allegations were the fondling of Rhonda and sexual
intercourse with Machele (R. at 128). Mr. Rich objected to
testimony about abuse of Rhonda, and, although the court
overruled the objection, the court did order the prosecutor not
to pursue that testimony.

Mr. Bond did not testify any further

regarding Rhonda's allegations.

The purposes of defendant's

objection were achieved, although the court overruled his
objection.

No further testimony about Rhonda's allegation was

given until defense counsel's cross-examination of Mr. Bond.
On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Mr. Bond
about other allegations in the following exchange:
Q. [By Mr. Rich] You referred to some
other allegetions [sic], and let's just take
a second to lay those to rest as well.
Both girls claimed that they had been
touched by their father?
A. Correct.
Q. And when you confronted Barry with
this he said — admitted that that was true,
did he not, that he had goosed them?
A. Right.
Q. And that he had on occasion playfully
touched their breasts?
A. I believe he referred to it as
pinching their breasts.
Q. And it was clear from the way he told
you about that that that to him wasn't a
sexual item?
A. He did not consider that inappropriate
or sexual.
Q. And while we may have a disagreement
about that, certainly he never intimated that
this was sexual conduct on his part toward
his daughters?
-14-

A.
(R. at 143-44).

He didn't see it that way.
As will be discussed in point II, counsel's

strategy was to minimize this evidence and attempt to turn it to
defendant's advantage.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by
admitting the testimony of Mr. Bond.

"The general rule

concerning abuse of discretion is that the appellate court 'will
presume that the discretion of the trial court was properly
exercised unless the record clearly shows the contrary.'"

State

v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902, 906 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (quoting Goddard
v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 534-35 (Utah 1984)).

The one mention

by Mr. Bond of Rhonda's allegation, in response to defendant's
request for clarification, does not constitute error.
brief mention which the State did not pursue.

It was a

It also was

explained when defendant cross-examined Mr. Bond.

Defendant had

admitted to Mr. Bond that he poked the girls "in the butt" and
pinched their breasts (R. at 143-44 and 244). Defendant did not
consider these actions to have sexual overtones and did not
consider them to be inappropriate behavior (R. at 143-44 and
244).

Given the explanation of that behavior elicited from Mr.

Bond and from defendant, and given the fact that defendant had
admitted the behavior when first questioned by Mr. Bond,
admission of Mr. Bond's mention of Rhonda's allegation was not
error.
The other admissibility issue which defendant may have
preserved for appeal is the testimony that Vivian had given drugs
to her fifteen-year-old daughter.

-15-

In his brief, defendant claims

error in the admission of evidence that Vivian had asked her
daughter to bear defendant's child; however, the record shows
that defendant never objected to admission of that portion of the
evidence (R. at 190-91, 205, and 210).
The first testimony about Vivian's actions came when
defense counsel was cross-examining Machele.

Mr. Rich asked

Machele if there came a time when the arguments between Vivian's
family and Machele "escalated" (R. at 190). Machele answered:
A. No. It was not over that [Machele
teaching Vivian's children how to do the
laundry the way defendant wanted it done].
It was over him and Vivian and Misty. Misty
asked — Vivian asked Misty if she would have
their baby.
(R. at 190). Counsel asked several more questions eliciting the
details about Machele's knowledge of this request (R. at 191-92).
On redirect examination, the prosecutor obtained more details
from Machele; no objection was interposed (R. at 205).
When the victim's sister, Rhonda, also testified
regarding Vivian's request, the only objection interposed was a
hearsay objection (R. at 211). However, when Rhonda went on to
testify that Vivian had given Misty drugs, defense counsel moved
for mistrial (R. at 211-13).

The motion, heard outside of the

presence of the jury, was that the prosecution had "elicited
testimony of an extremely prejudicial nature unrelated to the
events, and based on that I [Mr. Rich] think that the jury cannot
help but be tainted and a mistrial is the only remedy" (R. at
212).

While it is not completely clear, the motion appears to

have been addressed solely to the evidence that Vivian, an
upcoming defense witness, had provided drugs to a juvenile (R. at
-Ifi-

212-13).

The prosecutor argued that the drug evidence was no

more prejudicial than evidence that Vivian wanted Misty to bear
defendant's child.

That evidence had come out on defendant's

cross-examination of Machele and had not been objected to or
stricken (R. 213-14).
In State v. DiBello, 780 P.2d 1221 (Utah 1989), the
Utah Supreme Court addressed a similar issue.

The court found

that admission of a videotape showing the decedent was error
because its "gruesomeness" created unfair prejudice which was not
outweighed by any probative value.

However, the court determined

that the error was harmless because defendant did not challenge,
either at trial or on appeal, introduction of still photographs
which showed the same gruesome scene.

DiBello's failure to

object or appeal inclusion of the still photographs "effectively
undermined his claim that the improper introduction of the
comparably gruesome videotape constituted harmful error."

JEd. at

1231 (citing State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 60, 64-65 (Utah 1983)).
Just as in DiBello, defendant did not object to the arguably more
prejudicial testimony that defendant and his wife sought to have
her fifteen-year-old daughter bear defendant's child.

This

failure effectively undermines defendant's claim that testimony
that defendant's wife provided drugs to her daughter constituted
harmful error.
Defense counsel responded to this argument that he had
not intended to elicit evidence about the daughter bearing
The daughter, Misty, testified that her mother had given her
something to calm her once when Misty was upset because Machele
made her "nervous" (R. at 285).
-17-

defendant's child, and that Machele had

,f

blindside[d],f him.

When

that occurred, he chose to ignore or minimize the testimony
rather than emphasize it in the jurors' minds (R. at 214).
The trial court determined that the statements about
Vivian providing drugs was no "more than marginally prejudicial,
if they are prejudicial" (R. at 215). "'[A]ppraisal of the
probative and prejudicial value of evidence . . . is generally
entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial judge and will not
be upset on appeal absent manifest error.'"

State v. Featherson,

781 P.2d 424, 431 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d
981, 983 (Utah 1989)).

The testimony of the victim established

defendant's guilt of the charges; the "marginally prejudicial"
evidence of other bad acts was not "sufficiently prejudicial that
there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for .
. . defendant in its absence."

Featherson, 781 P.2d at 431.

The jury properly performed its function in evaluating
the testimony presented at trial and the credibility of the
witnesses.

If the trial court erred in allowing certain

evidence, there is no reasonable probability of a different
result, given the failure of defendant to either object at all to
certain evidence, or to object to the introduction of evidence
which was arguably as prejudicial as the challenged testimony.
Therefore, the likelihood of a different result had the jury not
heard the evidence that defendant objected to is not great.
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POINT II
DEFENDANT WAS AFFORDED THE EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
Defendant next contends, in point IV of his brief, that
his counsel provided ineffective assistance at trial.

The Utah

Supreme Court stated the standard for reviewing a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel in State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401
(Utah 1986) # wherein it said:
In claiming ineffective counsel, defendant
has the burden to demonstrate that counsel's
representation falls below an objective
standard of reasonableness. Codianna v.
Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1108-09 (Utah 1983).
Defendant must prove that specific,
identified acts or omissions fall outside the
wide range of professionally competent
assistance. The claim may not be
speculative, but must be a demonstrative
reality, sufficient to overcome the strong
presumption that counsel rendered adequate
assistance and exercised "reasonable
professional judgment." Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 . . . (1984); State
v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187, 1204 (Utah 1984).
And, an unfavorable result does not compel a
conclusion of ineffective assistance of
counsel. State v. Buel# 700 P.2d [701,] 703
[(Utah 1985)].
Furthermore, any deficiency must be
prejudicial to defendant. . . . To be found
sufficiently prejudicial, defendant must
affirmatively show that a "reasonable
probability" exists that, but for counsel's
error, the result would have been different.
Id. at 405. As the United States Supreme Court said in
Strickland:
Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance
must be highly deferential. . . . [A] court
must indulge a strong presumption that
counsel's conduct falls within the wide range
of reasonable professional assistance; that
is, the defendant must overcome the
presumption that, under the circumstances,
the challenged action "might be considered
sound trial strategy."
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£d. at 689 (citing Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).
"'Decisions as to . . . what objections to make . • . are
generally left to the professional judgment of counsel.'"

State

v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1987) (quoting State v.
Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 91 (Utah 1982)).
More recently, the Utah Supreme Court upheld a
conviction of two counts of sodomy of a child against a claim
that trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to object to
evidence of "other alleged wrongful conduct on the part of the
defendant[.]"

State v. Julian, 771 P.2d 1061, 1063 (Utah 1989).

The court said:
However, after reviewing the record, we are
not convinced that defendant has sufficiently
demonstrated counsel's ineffectiveness in
this regard. In fact, the record supports a
determination that counsel made a conscious
decision to allow introduction of the
testimony in question in order to demonstrate
[his] theory [of the case.] , . , While
counsel conceivably took a risk by [following
this procedure], defendant cannot now
complain that the defense was ineffective
because it was unsuccessful.
Id. at 1063-64 (footnote omitted).
The lack of objections by defendant's trial counsel
falls within the realm of trial strategy.

The material which

defendant felt should have been objected to is listed in his
brief at pages 19 and 20. At trial, defense counsel's theory of
the case was that Machele and Rhonda had made up a story of abuse
in order to be removed from defendant's custody.

To this end, he

called witnesses who testified that the girls had told them that
that was their plan, and a witness who allegedly saw the script
of the story (R. at 264-65, 269, 288-89, 292-93, and 295-96).
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Given this theory, defense counsel's apparent strategy was to
allow Machele and Rhonda latitude in developing their story so
that the testimony would sound like a fabrication.
Counsel also explained his strategy in the context of
the motion for mistrial that he made during Rhonda's testimony.
Some of the evidence which defendant now objects to came as
volunteered testimony which defense counsel could not have
anticipated.

As counsel noted, when that occurred, his "options

at that point [were] either leave it alone or go further out of .
. . [his] way to remind the jury.

[He chose] to leave it alone."

(R. at 214). This strategy does not sink to the level of
deficient performance; it is legitimate trial strategy which
defendant now seeks to second-guess.
Even if counsel's failure to object were to be
considered deficient performance, the second prong of the
Strickland-Frame test must be met.

Defendant's burden is to

"affirmatively show that a 'reasonable probability' exists that,
but for counsel's error, the result would have been different."
Frame, 723 P.2d at 405.

Defendant's brief does not even attempt

to meet this affirmative burden.

After defining "reasonable

probability," defendant cites the evidence he now objects to,
states that admission of the evidence was improper, and states
that admission of the evidence "meets the two part test for
ineffective assistance of counsel."

(Br. of App. at 19-20).

No

analysis is provided to demonstrate a reasonable probability of a
different result had trial counsel objected to all of the
evidence defendant cites.

See State v. Montes# No. 890336-CA,
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slip op. at 4-5 (Utah Ct. App. Jan. 8, 1991) (defendant offered
no analysis or explanation as to how counsel's actions affected
the outcome of trial; court did not need to reach issue of
deficient performance).

Because defendant has not demonstrated

to this Court how his trial counsel's failure to object raised a
reasonable probability of a different result in his trial,
defendant has not met the second prong of the Frame test.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR BY
ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF OTHER BAD ACTS BY
DEFENDANT.
Again without record citations or analysis of the
applicability of case law to the argument, defendant claims that
the trial court committed plain error in the admission of
evidence.

The standard for determining plain error is found in

State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah), cert, denied, 110 S.Ct. 62
(1989):
The first requirement for a finding of plain
error is that the error be "plain," i.e.,
from our examination of the record, we must
be able to say that it should have been
obvious to a trial court that it was
committing error. . . . The second and
somewhat interrelated requirement for a
finding of plain error is that the error
affect the substantial rights of the accused,
i.e., that the error be harmful.
773 P.2d at 35 (citations and footnote omitted).
As in his earlier claims, defendant does not analyze
how the alleged errors were obvious to the trial court, or how
their admission was harmful.

Defendant relies on the conclusory

assertions that
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the instant case presents a situation where a
high degree of harmfulness exists which would
justify a waiver of the obviousness
requirement.
In this case[,] the evidence of
defendant's improper • . . conduct • . . was
certainly harmful to the defendant and
affected substantial rights of the defendant.
(Br. of App. at 22).

Because defendant has failed to analyze and

provide record citations for his claim/ this Court should decline
to review the issue.

State v. Wareham# 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah

1989).
Addressing the merits of the claim, defendant has not
met the requirements of the plain error test.

Even if some of

the evidence defendant now complains of may have been
objectionable and possibly obvious to the trial court, the court
was also aware of defense counsel's intention to avoid
emphasizing unexpected testimony by objecting and moving to
strike the evidence.

Instead, counsel used the witnesses to

explain and minimize defendant's conduct with Rhonda.

Counsel

also allowed testimony of other actions by defendant to support
his theory that Machele and Rhonda had fabricated their stories
in order to be removed from defendant's custody.

Since the court

could perceive this trial strategy, it was not obvious to the
trial court that defense counsel was creating error by deciding
not to object to certain evidence.
POINT IV
REMARKS BY THE PROSECUTOR IN CLOSING ARGUMENT
ARE NOT REVERSIBLE ERROR.
Defendant's final contention is that the prosecutor
committed reversible error in closing argument when he "expressed
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a personal opinion as to the credibility of some of the witnesses
called on behalf of the defendant."

(Br. of App. at 22).

In this claim as well, defendant is required to have
preserved the matter for review.

A failure to object to comments

made by the prosecutor in closing argument waives the issue for
appellate review.

State v. Humphrey, 793 P.2d 918, 925 (Utah Ct.

App. 1990); see also State v. Hales, 652 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah
1982).

The record demonstrates that no objections were raised to

the two statements in closing argument that defendant now
challenges (R. at 317 and 318). Because defendant failed to
object to the statements, this Court should decline to review the
issue.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests
that this Court affirm defendant's conviction and sentence.
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